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Abstract - Quota trade in Ireland is ‘ring fenced’ to
milk processors where farmers are not allowed to trade
milk quota outside their designated milk processor. This
ensures milk production staying within a region but has
implications for the efficiency of milk production. In this
paper, we simulated a free milk quota market in Ireland
and compared the results with a milk quota exchange
which was ring fenced to determine if the quota move
from an inefficient region to a more efficient region. The
results show that quota indeed follow efficiency of
production when there is restriction over trade area.
Keywords- Milk quota trade, Irish quota market, Farm
level model
I. INTRODUCTION
Dairy production in Ireland, as in all other EU
Member States, is constrained by production quotas.
Milk quota transfers between farmers have been
allowed in the EU since the early 1980s, although to
varying degrees in different Member States. Quota
trade in Ireland, like Germany, parts of Scotland and
France, is regionalised or “ring-fenced”; this means
intra-regional trade is permitted but inter-regional
trade is not. The motivations behind the ring-fencing
of milk quota in Ireland mostly relate to social, rural
development and local political objectives. While ring-
fencing may be successful in meeting these goals, it
has implications for the efficiency of the milk
producing sector as a whole. The efficiency of the
sector is particularly relevant given the imminent
abolition of quotas. It is critical for policymakers to
implement a trading mechanism that places the sector
in the best possible competitive position to prosper
following quota abolition. Previous research has
shown that quota markets with the minimum
government intervention and restriction possible yield
the most efficient outcome.
The objective of this paper is to explore the
implications of shifting to a national free market for
milk quota. The paper draws on research conducted in
a number of other Member States on milk quota trade.
Following methodologies employed by others, a farm-
level linear programming model is developed to
estimate the effect of a national milk quota market.
The results of this scenario are compared to a baseline
situation, which only permits regional trade, to
examine the movement of quota. The model is
simulated for the full sample of dairy farms in the Irish
FADN dataset, and with national aggregation factors
the impact of quota trade on farm structures is
estimated.
II.BACKGROUND
In the early 2000s the trade of milk quota in Ireland
was through an administered system. Under this
system the trade price and reallocation of quota were
determined by the Minister for Agriculture in
consultation with industry stakeholders. In January
2007 this scheme was replaced with an exchange
system. In the exchange system farmers can bid to
purchase or sell quota at their desired price. Quota is
then traded at the market equilibrium price, albeit with
some intervention and market cooling mechanisms.
1
Purchasers are allowed a maximum allocation of
80,000 litres per exchange which occurs twice a year.
Each dairy processor operates an exchange and quotas
are ring-fenced so that they can not be moved from
1 Full information on the milk quota exchange scheme is available from
www.agriculture.gov.ie12
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one exchange to another. This ring-fencing
mechanism, therefore, ensures security of supply for
dairy processors. This exchange system has given rise
to over thirty separate markets for quota in Ireland,
with prices in the second 2007 exchange varying from
11 cent per litre in some exchanges to 28 cent in
others. In this paper the economic implications of this
quota trade system are explored.
There has been much written on the effect of the EU
milk quota system on efficiency for example the
impact on assets values [1, 2, 3]. These papers, and
many others, tend to support the general theory put
forward by Alston [4] and Oskam [5]; that the
imposition of a quota generates an economic
inefficiency in the sector but that the more freely
traded quotas are, the smaller that inefficiency. Oskam
states that if quotas are freely tradable, more efficient
farmers will purchase quota from less efficient farmers
and as a result the national quota will be produced at a
lower cost.
A number of empirical studies have attempted to
quantify the relationship between quota trade and
sector efficiency. Boots [6] analysed the welfare costs
of trade distortions in the exchange of milk quota in
the Netherlands. They used a simulation model to
quantify the short-term effects of quota trade distortion
for a panel of specialist Dutch dairy farms. They
concluded that the free tradability of quotas would
increase farm profit and lead to a geographical
concentration of milk production. As their model was
only estimated for a sample of specialist producers
they could not aggregate their results to make
conclusions about sectoral efficiency. Similarly,
Colman [7, 8] developed a model to estimate the
optimal allocation of milk quota in the UK. These
studies compared the optimal allocation of quota to the
one that existed in the UK at the time. The results
showed that substantially more redistribution of quota
was required for the UK dairy farm structure to reach
its optimal position. These studies used various
techniques to estimate quota values and simulate quota
trade with the objective of explaining variability in
quota values, projecting structural change or exploring
different quota arrangements. None of these studies
however, focussed on the efficiency loss to the sector
as a whole of the regionalisation of milk quota. In this
paper we use National Farm Survey (NFS) data for
Ireland [9] and price and cost projections from the
FAPRI-Ireland model
2 to identify the regional
variation in the efficiency in the dairy sector and
simulate quota movement in a freer quota market.
III.First quota exchange
The first exchange took place in January, 2007.
Farmers bid to buy or sell quota in 31 co-operatives. A
total of 172 million litres of quota was demanded and
120 million litres of quota was offered for sale.
However, only 44 million litres of quota was traded at
different market clearing prices across the different
exchanges. The market clearing prices in these co-
operatives ranged from as low as 0.11 cent per litre
(cpl) in Lakeland to 0.23 cpl in Dairygold and
Wexford. Figure 1 clearly suggests three different
levels of quota prices in the county. The south eastern
part of the country had the maximum market clearing
price while the northern parts had the lowest market
clearing prices, with the south west falling in between.
We can distinguish these three regions as; the South
East, the South West and the BMW regions. An
analysis of the NFS data provides characteristics of
these three regions (Table 1). The South East region
has the highest number of sampled farms and quota
followed by the BMW and South West regions. The
data shows that farms in the BMW region receive the
highest average milk price; however, the costs of
production per litre of milk are also the higher in that
region. The data shows that farms in the BMW region
are the least efficient with average net margin from
milk production of 0.9 cpl compared to farms in the
South East with 1.5 cpl and the South West at 1.3 cpl.
2 FAPRI-Ireland model is a part of FAPRI model which was established in
the Universities of Iowa and Missouri in 1984 and uses partial equilibrium
models of agricultural markets to show the effects of policy change on
commodity prices, volumes of production and trade and many other
economic indicators. For a description of the Irish model see [10]12
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Figure 1: The first quota exchange 2007-08 [11]
Table 1: Number of sampled farms and total milk
quota in three regions
BMW South East South West
Sampled Farms 119 (1.6%) 254 (2.2%) 85 (1.1%)
Total quota 29 mil l 73 mil l 17 mil l
Milk yield (l/cow) 5085 5120 4544
Milk price (cpl) 25.4 25.3 25.0
Costs of prod. (cpl) 24.5 23.8 23.7
Data on bids for sale and purchase received in each
exchange were secured from the Irish Department of
Agriculture and this data was analysed to examine the
outcome of the first milk quota exchange. Figure 2
presents the regional pooled bids for purchase and sale
of quota. The bids are pooled in three regional
markets. The South East region is usually considered
to have the best comparative advantage for dairy
production in the country. The data shows that farms
in the South East region demanded 103 million litres
of quota whereas total quantity of bids to supply was
just 48 million litres. When the bids recorded in each
of the co-operatives in this region were pooled the
equilibrium trade price is estimated to be
approximately 21.5 cent per litre and trade is estimated
at approximately 39 million litres. The South West
region would be considered the next most suitable
region for milk production in the country.
Approximately 45 million litres of quota were
demanded in this region and 29 million litres supplied.
When the bids are pooled for this region the
equilibrium exchange price is estimated at 17 cent per
litre and at this price approximately 20 million litres
would be exchanged. The final region, the BMW
region, covers the midlands, border and west regions,
this area would traditionally be considered the most
disadvantaged for milk production. In this region,
supply (38 million litres) exceeded demand (24
million litres). The estimated equilibrium trade price
for this region is the lowest at 13 cent per litre and the
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Figure 3: National pooled bids for quota trade in first
exchange, 2007
In order to gain some insight into what price might
prevail if quota is traded nationally; all bids for sale
and purchase were pooled to derive national supply
and demand curves for quota. Figure 3 presents the
national demand and supply of quota based on bids
submitted in the first exchange. The Figure shows that
18.5 cent per litre would be the national equilibrium
and a total of 75 million litres of quota would be
traded in a national exchange. It should be noted
however, that the equilibrium price in Figure 3 is
based on bids made by farmers participating in a
regional exchange. It is probable that if farmers were
operating in a national exchange they would revise
their bids, up or down to reflect their expectations on
the outcome of a national exchange. However, in the
absence of any data on how farmers would have
behaved under a different set of circumstances it is
assumed that 18.5 cpl is the national equilibrium price.
IV. FARM LEVEL MODEL
In the EU, many studies have been carried out to
analyse different aspects of milk quota trade [6, 12,
13]. These studies used a number of models such as
micro-econometric and CGE models to simulate a
quota market within a region. In this paper, a farm
level linear programming (LP) model is developed,
which uses farm level data taken from the Irish
National Farm Survey (NFS), to simulate milk quota
trade. The model is a static LP model which
maximises farm profit within a range of limiting farm
resources. The general form of the model is;
Max z = Σ(pf * xf) – (cf* xf)
s.t. Af * xf Rf
xf  0
where, z is the farm profit, xf is the farm activities
for farm type f, pf is a measure of the returns and cf are
the costs procured for xf activity, Af is an input –
output coefficient for activity xf, while Rfis a limiting
resource such as milk quota, land and labour.
As the LP model runs at the farm level, it is able to
simulate quota trade taking account of the
heterogeneity of farms. As the model maximises farm
profit, the model is structured such that quota moves
to the most profitable/efficient farm. If a farmer’s
individual quota value is higher than the equilibrium
price then the farmer would buy quota, conversely if
the individual quota value is lower than the
equilibrium price then quota would be sold. The model
is constrained such that if a sale occurs, all quota
rights are sold, this is to avoid marginal quota sales
which do not occur in reality. Purchase of quota is








National Equilibrium Price 18.5 cpl12
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n n
∑     bquota(f,y) ≤  ∑squota(ff,y); y
f=1 ff=1
where, bquota is bought quota; squota is sold quota;
f is the n number of farm types; y is the number of
years, and ff is an alias of f such that ff Сf but ff ≠  f. 
For equilibrium, total bought quota is made equal to
total sold quota within the whole sample;
∑  bquota(f,y) = ∑  squota(f,y) f, y
Dairy farms that wish to expand have a maximum
of 160,000 litres of milk quota to bid each year, i.e.
80,000 litres per exchange. Based on Shalloo [14], it is
assumed that an expanding farm can increase milk
production either by implementing better management
on the farm and increasing milk yield per cow by 10%
without incurring additional costs (except for costs of
extra feed required) or increase the farm’s
specialisation in milk production by disposing of beef
animal and increasing dairy cow numbers. Due to land
fragmentation issues, land transfer between farms was
not allowed and dairy farms could replace a maximum
of 50% of their dry stocks on existing farmland. For
this second assumption of expansion, building costs,
bulk tank costs, feed costs and labour costs were
included for additional dairy animals. However, a loss
in farm margin due to replaced beef animals was also
incorporated in the model (for detail, please refer to
[14]).
V. QUOTA MOVEMENT
The LP model was simulated for all dairy farms in
the 2004 NFS under national quota trade scenarios.
The prices and costs were projected to 2007 by using
the price indices from FAPRI-Ireland model. The
average national equilibrium price, 18.5 cpl,
determined from pooled bids from the first milk quota
exchange was used in the model. Two trade scenarios
were examined; in the first scenario there is a
maximum quota purchase limit of 160,000 litres, as
exists currently in the exchange rules, and in the
second scenario there is no such limit on amount of
quota purchases. The results of the model indicate that
the South East region would gain milk quota if a
national milk quota exchange was implemented. It is
estimated that the total quota level of this region
would increase by 1.5% under the first scenario
(Figure 4, a). The other two regions, the BMW and the
South West, are both projected to lose milk quota. The
BMW region is projected to lose almost 3% of milk
quota whereas the South West region would lose
approximately 1% of milk quota. As expected the
amount of quota traded increased when the limit on
purchases was removed under the second scenario
(Figure 4, b). There is also a change in the amount of
quota exiting in the South West and BMW regions
under this scenario when compared to the first
scenario. The South West region is projected to
recover one third of quota loss suggesting that the
profitable farms in the region are capable to purchase
more quota once the limit on purchase of quota is
removed. In contrast to that, the BMW region is
projected to lose 31% more quota which shows that at
the given equilibrium price, there are not enough
efficient farms in the region to benefit from removal of
limit on purchase of milk quota. These results can also
be analysed by examining structural change in the
farm sector in each region. The simulation shows that
the highest ratio of expanding to exiting farms in the
South East region compared to other two regions
(Figure 5, a).There are, however, a large proportion of
farms in all regions that remain unchanged under the
first scenario. The number of these unchanged farms
decreased substantially when the limit on quota traded
was removed (Figure 5, b). The BMW has the highest
proportion of exiting farms and the lowest proportion
of expanding farms compared to other two regions.
Farms selling quota have lower than average
efficiency levels and thus find it more profitable to
exit production. When the restriction on quota
purchases is removed, more farms exit the sector and
more milk quota is transferred to efficient producers,
thus increasing the overall efficiency in the sector. It
can be concluded that placing individual farm limits
on quota purchase introduces an additional
inefficiency into the sector. The results therefore
confirm expectations that the abolition of milk quota
ring fencing would increase the efficiency of the
sector but would also lead to a geographical
concentration of milk production.12
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Figure 4: Proportion of milk quota transaction in three regions under (a) restrictedand (b) unrestricted quantity of
quota traded
Figure 5: Proportion of farm numbers exiting and expanding in three regions under(a) restricted and (b)
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VI. CONCLUSION
Data from the first milk quota exchange operated in
Ireland showed that amount of quota traded was
significantly less, by almost a third, than the totals
offered for sale or purchase. This suggests that a large
number of farms wishing to exit or expand were not
able to do so under ring-fenced quota trade and thus
ring-fencing introduced a distortion in the market and
an impediment to structural change.
The analysis of milk quota exchange data suggests
that there is substantial regional variation in quota
values. This indirectly represents the regional
variability in farm level efficiency. The analysis
conducted in this paper shows that if Ireland shifted to
a national market for milk quota, rather than a regional
one, that substantially more milk quota would be
traded and that there would be more structural change.
Quota would move to the most efficient farms
nationally rather than just the most efficient
regionally. This would have positive benefits for the
efficiency levels of the sector as a whole. The
efficiency gains would increase if there were no
individual restrictions on quota trade. The results of
this analysis support the findings of other empirical
studies on this topic; that milk quotas introduce an
inefficiency to the sector but that this inefficiency can
be minimised if quotas can be traded freely between
farmers. The results therefore indicate that a national
market for milk quota may be a more efficient policy
to prepare the sector for the eventual removal of milk
quota.
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